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Abstract
Basic underlying mechanisms of discounting delayed rewards remain unclear
(Green & Myerson, 2013). There has been evidence that attentional mechanisms (e.g.,
fixation and fixation duration) could be further investigate processes related to the
discounting of delayed rewards (Franco-Watkins, Matteson, & Jackson, 2016). FrancoWatkins et al. (2016) was the first to propose a measure of attentional mechanisms in a
discounting paradigm, known as selection bias. The authors found selection bias was
positively correlated with choice behavior. The present study replicated selection bias
using a titration procedure and Area Under the Curve scores. This study also analyzed
selection bias across choice presentations at the individual level. Our findings reveal that
there are potential artifacts with discounting procedures. When choices were presented in
a logical sequence, selection bias predicted choice behavior. When choices were
randomized in a way that a participant could not predict the next choice, attention did not
predict choice behavior. Overall, our findings suggest further research is needed to for a
better understanding of eye-tracking within discounting paradigms.
Key words: discounting, attention, eye-tracking, choice behavior

vi

RUNNING HEAD: ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOR

1

Attentional Processing: Replication and Extension of Selection Bias as a Predictor of
Intertemporal Choice Behavior
Impulsivity is a multifactorial construct with varying definitions. The
disagreement among researchers is in part due to theoretical approaches (Evenden, 1999).
Impulsivity is commonly used to refer to problematic behavior characterized by failures
to attend, inhibit a response, and/or consider probable negative long-term outcomes of a
behavior. For example, a child may be considered impulsive when they yell out
comments or interrupt in class. A college student would be described as impulsive when
they go out the night before an exam instead of studying. An adult may also be
considered impulsive when they go on a shopping spree without considering the interest
payments at the end of the month.
One approach to investigate impulsivity has been to study preferences between
smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. Choices may be considered impulsive when an
animal has a tendency to choose a smaller reward over a larger reward. For example, an
animal may be considered impulsive when choosing to forage at a patch with a smaller
number of berries that is closer to them over a batch with more berries that is farther
away, because of the potential detrimental outcome of less food. However, choices are
not always this simple. Choices often involve delay to receiving a reward or have some
probability associated with receiving said reward.
Two areas of particular interest in behavioral economics are temporal and
probabilistic discounting. Temporal, or delay, discounting refers to the decrease in
subjective value as the delay to receiving a reward increase. Probabilistic discounting
refers to the decrease in subjective value of a reward as the odds against receiving it
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increases. These two types of discounting represent intertemporal and risky choice
phenomena.
The discounting framework provides a systematic methodology for studying
impulsivity that involves choices with outcomes varying at different points in time and/or
outcomes that are more or less likely to occur. The field of behavioral economics has also
come to influence the ways in which researchers’ study decision-making. Specifically,
behavioral economists have provided evidence that contradicts standard economic theory,
which assumes humans are rational decision makers (Thaler, 1981).
Procedures
Discounting procedures involve choices between a smaller, sooner reward and a
larger, later reward. For example, participants are presented with choices between $500
now or $1,000 in 1 year. Most commonly, the smaller, sooner reward is adjusted until
there is an equal likelihood of choosing both the smaller, sooner and larger, later reward,
also known as the indifference point. The amount of the smaller, sooner reward at
indifference points are determined to be the subjective value of the reward. This same
logic is used for both delay and probability discounting procedures. In probability choices
between smaller, certain rewards are crossed with larger, less certain rewards. For
example, participants are presented with choices between $500 for sure or $1,000 with a
5% chance.
Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991) pioneered a common procedure to evaluate the
exponential and hyperbolic discounting models for delay and probability discounting
with human participants. To determine the subjective value of a reward, participants were
asked to state their preference for a reward between hypothetical amounts of $1,000 now
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or $1,000 with delays ranging from 1 month to 50 years. Similar choices were presented
with probabilities ranging from 5% to 95%. For each delay and probability, an adjustingamount procedure was used that decreased the amount of money available immediately.
A prescribed list of 30 different amounts were presented in a fixed sequence. Half of the
participants were exposed to immediate-amounts presented up then down, and the other
half were exposed to immediate-amounts presented down then up. For example, in the
“up then down” 1-month condition, participants selected a preference for $1 Now or
$1,000 in 1 month. The second choice was then $5 Now or $1,000 in 1 month. In the
similar “down the up”, participants first selected a preference for $1,000 Now or $1,000
in 1 Month. The second choice was then $990 Now or $1,000 in 1 month. This process
was repeated for every prescribed amount across each delay and probability condition.
Indifference points were derived by averaging the amounts before and after participants
switched their preference to the immediate or delayed outcome.
Another common procedure for measuring discounting is the titration procedure
(Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, &
Wit, 1999). As with the fixed-sequence procedure, participants make choices between
smaller-sooner amounts and larger-later amounts. The participants’ previous choice then
brackets their subsequent choices, excluding any values that fall outside of that range for
which their indifference might fall. When participants choose smaller-sooner amounts,
the next smaller-amount is decreased by half of the upper bound and lower bound. For
example, say a participant choose $500 now over $1,000 in 1 month. The participant is
now bracketed between $0 now (lower bound) and $500 now (upper bound), so the next
choice presented is $250 now or $1,000 in 1 month. If the participants choose the larger-
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later amount, the next choice reward in increased by half the amount between the upper
bound ($500) and lower bound ($250). For example, the next choice presented is $375
now and $1,000 in 1 month. This procedure then rapidly converges on an indifference
point using an iterative process over 6 to 7 choices. It is assumed that there is no utility in
asking participants more than once about a particular choice. Indifference points are
derived by estimating the value between the last choice and the next potential choice.
Regardless of the procedures used, the research generally concludes that any
differences in observed discounting values are non-systematic (Odum & Baunamann.
2010). Rozden, Berry, and Odum (2011) used a within-subjects design to compare fixedsequence and titration procedures. The authors reported no statistical differences between
the degree of discounting for the fixed-sequence and titration procedures. AUC values
also produced no statistical differences and were strongly correlated (Rozden et al.,
2011). Thus, researchers may select a discounting procedure due to convenience of
implementation without the threat to internal validity.
Typically, hypothetical rewards are used in discounting research with human
participants. For example, in Rachlin et al. (1999), participants were asked questions
about money but never received compensation for their choices. The use of hypothetical
rewards is concerning because hypothetical rewards have the chance of theoretically
increasing the probability that participants would make all choices as if they were not
real. However, research supports the use of hypothetical rewards as substitutes for real
rewards. Hypothetical rewards reveal no differences across rates of discounting as
compared to real rewards (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Lagario & Madden, 2005; Madden,
Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Madden et al., 2004). Thus, the use of hypothetical
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rewards acts as a quick and cost-efficient method of assessing discounting functions with
human participants.
Analyses
Discounting models. One way in which indifference points are analyzed is by
fitting observed values to the nonlinear regression models. A decrease in subjective value
is a result of each additional unit of delay, decreasing the ratio of amount to delay. One
formula proposed to describe delay discounting was based on the standard utility model
in economics. The model assumed that the value of future a reward should decrease due
to the risk involved in waiting for that reward. This model also assumed that this risk
occurs at a constant rate. For example, when an animal is foraging for food, there may a
constant probability that a predator would prevent that animal from obtaining food. If this
constant rate does exists, then such discounting could be explained using an exponential
value function:
Vd = Ae-kd (1)
where Vd is the discounted value of a future reward, A is the amount of the reward, d is
the delay to its receipt, k is the rate of discounting, and e is a base of the natural logarithm
(2.718).
Behavior economists have proposed alternatives to exponential discounting to
counter the argument that humans are rational decision makers. Systematic deviations
from the exponential discounting function have been well documented in both human and
non-human animals (see Vanderveldt, Olivera, & Green, 2016). Mazur (1987) proposed
the discounting function is a hyperbola:
V = A/(1+kD) (2)
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where the variables share the same relation as exponential discounting model but takes a
hyperbolic form where the values decrease more rapidly at smaller delays and decrease
more slowly at longer delays. When the exponential and hyperbola functions are fit to
observed values, the exponential function tends over-predict observed values at smaller
delays and under-predict at larger delays. Research supports that temporal discounting is
described better by this hyperbolic function by correcting for the over-predictions and
under-predictions of the exponential model (Green & Myerson, 2004). However, the
Equation 2 also tends to over-predict observed values at smaller delays and under-predict
larger delays. This equation is also used more often when a single-index of discounting is
needed to make comparisons across or within-groups (Green & Myerson, 2004).
Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994) were the first to propose a hyperbola-like
function where the denominator is raised to the power of s:
V = A/(1+kD)s (3)
This s parameter represents a nonlinear scaling parameter for amount and/or time. When
s = 1, the hyperbola-like function is reduced to Equation 2. When s < 1, the discounting
curve decreases less sharply at larger delay values than it does when described by the
hyperbola formula. Green and Myerson (2004) argued that the hyperbola-like model
accurately describes the relations between subjective value and delay as well as the
amount of variance accounted for over the exponential and hyperbola discounting
models. By adding the s parameter, the proportion of variance accounted for is
statistically significant and has been replicated through numerous studies (Green &
Myerson, 2004). The significant increase in the variance explained by Equation 3 is
greater than what would be expected by having two free parameters rather than one free
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parameter like Equation 1 and 2 (Green & Myerson, 2004). Also, the second free
parameter not only provides a better fit at the group level but provides a better fit of the
data at the individual level (Green & Myerson, 2004). A better fit of the data is
particularly important when describing the shape of the discounting function or
quantifying the rate of discounting at the individual or group levels.
The discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards can also be described by the
hyperbola-like model (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999):
V = A/(1+bX)s (4)
V represents the subjective value of a delayed or probabilistic reward, A represents
amount, b is rate of discounting, X represents the independent variable (e.g. delay or odds
against), and s represents the nonlinear scaling parameter. Green et. al (1999) found
evidence that the hyperbola-like model describes the discounting of both delayed and
probabilistic rewards, where the exponent was significantly less than 1, and the additional
free parameter significantly improved the fit of the data. Further evidence that the
hyperbola-like model describes both delay and probability discounting was found by
Estle, Green, Myerson, and Holt (2006). This evidence suggested support of the
hypothesis that similar processes were involved in the discounting of delayed and
probabilistic rewards. However, this interpretation would be later challenged (see
Discounting Processes).
The research on discounting has implications for a variety of socially important
issues, such as substance abuse (Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010), financial risk
(Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989), and obesity (Price, Higgs, Maw, & Lee, 2016).
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Discounting has been established in a variety of nonhuman species as well (Vanderveldt,
Oliveira, & Green, 2016).
Area under the curve. Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana (2001) discussed
issues that arise when using mathematical models and inferential statistics to analyze
discounting functions. The authors mention that confidence intervals surrounding
individual estimates of individual participants’ data are large. There is also a large degree
of variability between subjects, and the distribution of k-values are skewed (Myerson,
Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The hyperbola-like model (Equation 3) also has two
free parameters of k and s, which makes quantifying discounting curves difficult to
simply quantify individual differences. The use of inferential statistics is particularly
useful when single-subject designs (e.g., ABAB) are not possible with discounting data
sets; however, skewed distributions make inferential analysis difficult. In such cases,
nonparametric analyses can be used, but these analyses are usually less powerful and
assume linear relations between estimates (Myerson et al., 2001). These issues are
especially true when making comparisons across amounts, within-subjects, or groups.
Thus, Myerson et al. (2001) developed a theoretically neutral measure of discounting
known as Area-Under-the-Curve (AUC).
AUC is calculated by normalizing delay and subjective values. Here delays are
expressed as a proportion of the maximum delay or probability, and subjective values are
expressed as proportion of the nominal amount. Trapezoids between data points are
drawn, and then area is calculated using the formula:
(x - x )[(y +y )/2] (5)
2

1

1

2
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where x1 and x2 represent the successive delays and y1 and y2 represent the subjective
values associated with those delays. Finally, the sum of all the trapezoids are taken to
gather the area under the discounting function. The area under the discounting function
can vary from 0.0 (steepest discounting possible) to 1.0 (no discounting).
Myerson et al. (2001) discussed several limitations with AUC as a measure of
discounting. First, due to values being expressed as proportions of normalized values
with values scaled from 0.0 to 1.0, making comparisons across studies cannot be obtained
unless adjustments of the independent variables are made. Another concern is that area
under two curves may be the same but have different shapes. Regardless of these
limitations, AUC measures are based on observed values and provide a theoretically
neutral measure of discounting. AUC is useful when a single index of discounting is
desired, such as making comparisons across individuals or groups. However, it is not a
substitute for a theoretically based discounting functions.
Discounting Processes
Researchers are interested in understanding the underlying processes that are
involved in discounting and its relation to impulsivity. Given that delay and probability
discounting are well described by a hyperbola-like equation, questions arise about
whether both are represented by the same psychological process or different
psychological processes. Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle (2003) noted several
explanations from previous research for the similarities among delay and probability
discounting in support the same process. For one, choices involving delay or probability
entail risk (Myerson et al., 2003). Delay increases the likelihood that something will
prevent receiving the reward. Environmental events that could prevent receiving the
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reward could occur during the delay period. Another reason is that probability also entails
delay. When the odds against receiving a reward is higher, repeated gambles must be
made in order to receive the reward. Those repeated gambles therefore necessarily delay
time to receiving the reward. Both delay and probability also reflect properties of
attribute weighting: decreasing absolute sensitivity and increasing proportional sensitivity
(Myerson et al., 2003). Increasing the attributes of two choice alternatives by a constant
decreases the preference for one over the other (decreasing absolute sensitivity). For
example, when you compare your preference for receiving $10 to $1 and $1,000 to $991.
Most people would have a stronger preference for the larger amount in the first
alternative and would have a weaker preference for the larger amount in the second
alternative; even though difference between the two choices is nine dollars in both
alternatives. Also, by multiplying the attributes of two alternatives increases the
preference for one over the other (increasing proportional sensitivity). For example,
compare your preferences to receiving $10 to $1 and $1000 to $100. People are more
likely to have a stronger preference for larger amount in the $1,000 choice alternative
than in the $10 choice alternative; even though both alternatives are multiplied by 10.
If the same psychological processes were involved in decisions regarding delayed
and probabilistic outcomes, then experimental manipulations should have the same
effect(s) on both types of discounting. If different processes were involved,
manipulations should have differential effects. Indeed, the literature provides more
evidence that demonstrates different processes might be involved in delay and probability
discounting (Green & Myerson, 2010; Green & Myerson, 2013).
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First, magnitude effects are a robust finding in the literature that demonstrate
larger delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed rewards. (Green
& Myerson, 2010). These effects have been observed in medical treatments, vacation
time, and directly consumable rewards (Green & Myerson, 2010). In terms of
probabilistic discounting, magnitude effects occur in the opposite direction. That is, large
probabilistic rewards are discounted more steeply than smaller probabilistic rewards.
Green and Myerson (2010) suggest that this opposite effect of amount supports that
different processes are involved in delay and probability discounting.
When the outcome of the reward is manipulated (e.g., gains vs. losses), mixed
results are observed. Experimental literature of preference reversals among delayed
rewards has been well established when outcomes involve gains (Green & Myerson,
2010). That is, those who prefer larger-later gains switch their preferences for smallersooner gains when considering both rewards in the future. Holt, Green, Myerson, and
Estle (2008) demonstrated preference reversals in delayed losses. Here, a choice is
considered to be impulsive when a person prefers to make larger-later payments over
smaller-sooner payments. Holt et al. (2008) found that, people preferred to make smallersooner payments at shorter delays and switched to making larger-later payments at longer
delays. The authors also found an absence of the magnitude effect. The amount of
rewards had no differential effects on choices involving the loss of a reward. Estle et al.
(2006) also found little to no magnitude effects for delay losses, opposite direction of
magnitude effects for probabilistic gains, and no effects for probabilistic losses. Green
and Myerson (2010) argue that these findings make impulsive choices situation specific,
clear similarities and differences exist for outcomes of gains vs. losses, and the processes
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involved in magnitude effects for losses appear to be non-existent, or minimally so, for
both delay and probabilistic discounting.
Green & Myerson (2010) also mention that correlational analyses should be
indicative of the process or processes involved in discounting. If delay and probability
discounting share the same process, then a negative correlation should exist. People who
cannot wait for a reward would show steep delay discounting. Those who cannot wait
would also not consider risks involved and should show shallow probability discounting.
However, the literature does not support this negative correlation between delay and
probability discounting (Green & Myerson, 2010). The authors argue that this strongly
suggests different processes are involved, and that delay-and probability discounting
represent different traits of impulsivity.
There is other evidence to support the different processes are involved. For
example, there differential effects of the b and s parameters in Equation 4 (Green &
Myerson, 2013). The literature shows that increasing the amounts of probabilistic
rewards increases the degree of discounting. Here, the s parameter increases, whereas s
remains constant in delay discounting (Green & Myerson, 2013). Increasing the amounts
of rewards, decreases the degree of delay discounting. Here the b parameter decreases,
whereas b remains constant (Green & Myerson, 2013). Yet again, this evidence
demonstrates different processes must be involved in delay and probability discounting.
This begs the question: what else should be considered to discover different processes
behind delay and probability discounting?
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Attentional Processes
Although there is a vast amount of research supporting the discounting
phenomenon, the understanding of the basic underlying processes still remains unclear
(Carter, Meyer, & Huettel, 2010; Green & Myerson, 2013; Franco-Watkin, Mattson, &
Jackson 2016). Understanding the discounting processes impacts our understanding of
the outcomes associated with choosing smaller, sooner rewards over larger, later rewards.
Understanding the outcomes then leads to the development of interventions to target
individuals who fail to consider the disadvantageous outcomes of choosing a smaller,
sooner reward. To shed light on the fundamental differences in the processes involved in
discounting, understanding the attentional mechanisms involved might be important.
In decision making, people have to attend to the variables in order to gather
information. Decision-making theories (e.g., Prospect Theory: Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) assume that value in choices is connected to the extent to which respondents attend
to the variables within the decision. Given the technological limitations, researchers were
unable to directly measure attention. Prior research has addressed attention without
specifying the type or its role in decision making (Franco-Watkins et al., 2016). Recently,
researchers have focused on overt attention (Franco-Watkins & Johnson, 2011a; FrancoWatkins & Johnson, 2011b, Franco-Watkins et al. 2016). With technological advances
(e.g., eye-tracking devices), researchers can now measure attentional processes in
decision making. Eye-tracking devices have allowed researchers to use attentional
measures to extend models that include binary and multi-attribute choices, such as the
Drift Diffusion Model (DDM; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel. 2010). DDM has shown that
a critical role in decision making, is the amount of time spent attending to competing
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options. Generally, information about comparative values is gathered by allocating
attention across different variables. Over time, individuals will fixate on the option with
greater subjective value until revisiting the alternative yields no further value, leading to a
choice.
Franco-Watkins et al. (2016) was one of the first studies to measure attentional
processes within an intertemporal choice paradigm (e.g., discounting). Using a Tobii eyetracking monitor paired with a fixed sequence discounting task, the authors sought to
address the discounting of gains and loss, as well as the correspondence of selection bias
and choice behavior. Participants completed two monetary gains tasks and two monetary
loss tasks. Delayed amounts of $100 and $1,000 were used for both gains and loss tasks.
Five preset amounts were crossed with the delayed amounts across five delay conditions
(1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years). For example, in the $100 gain amount
task, choice of $20, $40, $60, $80, and $100 Now were paired with $100 at each delay.
Choices were randomized, but it was unclear how the randomization occurred.
Participants pressed keys to indicate choice preference. Pressing 1 selected the immediate
choice. Pressing 2 selected the delayed choice. Of note here, is that the immediate choice
was always presented on the left.
To measure choice behavior, Franco-Watkins and colleagues used the mean
proportion of choosing the immediate option. Strong correlations were found between the
discounting parameter k and proportion of choosing the immediate option, leading the
authors to argue both measures yield similar interpretations of the data. In terms of
overall discounting, the authors replicated previous findings that people discount later
gains and prefer larger, later losses. Magnitude effects were found for the gains task,
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where higher k-values were reported for $100 gains than $1000 gains. However, no
magnitude effects were observed for monetary losses, supporting the general findings in
the discounting literature (Green & Myerson, 2013).
To capture attentional processes, Franco-Watkins and colleagues created four
Areas of Interest (AOIs) around the amount and delay variables in the task. The number
of fixations and fixation duration for each variable for each participant were measured. In
terms of eye-tracking variables, Franco-Watkins et al. (2016) found that participants
allocated more attention to monetary amounts over delays and more attention to larger,
delayed costs than larger, delayed gains. Selection bias (SB) scores were also used to
measure attentional processes. Selection bias scores range from -1 to + 1 and were
calculated using the formula:
SB = (AOI now time + AOI now money) - (AOI delay time + AOI delay
money)/Total AOIs (6)
SB scores of -1 indicated the participant was biased towards the delayed choice. SB
scores of +1 indicated the participant was biased towards the immediate choice. SB
scores of 0 indicated that there was no specific bias to either choice. These scores were
calculated for each choice trial. Only fixation count was used in the SB formula, because
strong correlations were reported between fixation and fixation durations. The authors
also reported that they were concerned with the deployment of attention and not the
amount of time spent. Using binary logistic regressions, SB scores were found to be a
significant predictor of immediate and delayed choices. Averaged SB scores across trials
for each participant were also created for a single metric. Averaged SB scores also
predicted overall proportions of choosing the immediate option. Franco-Watkins and

ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOR

16

colleagues reported that these results support that differential allocation is predictive of
choice in an intertemporal decision task. The authors mention that selection bias could
possibly be used to capture attentional processing throughout the trial as opposed to only
the last fixation, which is more informative of the processes involved in the choice.
Present Study
The purpose of this study was to replicate the findings, by Franco-Watkins et al.
(2016), that selection bias scores predict choice behavior and extend selection bias scores
to a titration procedure. Using similar independent and dependent variables as FrancoWatkins et al. (2016), the current study measured discounting of $1,000 gains via a
titration procedure. If there are no known systematic differences between fixed sequence
and titration procedures, selection bias should predict choice behavior in a titration
procedure. We predicted that a positive correlation would exist between proportion of
choosing the immediate option and selection bias scores, and similar relationships would
exist with other choice measures (e.g., AUC).
As noted above, selection bias scores can be used to capture attentional processes
throughout choice trials. Yet, this information is not yet known. Selection bias scores in a
titration procedure can be used to capture the process of how participants arrive at
indifference points. Arriving at indifference between two choices should also be
psychologically more difficult, which should be reflected through attentional mechanisms
(e.g., fixation and duration). In other words, the participants should allocate equal
amounts of attention to the immediate and delayed choices if they are truly indifferent
between the two choices. We predicted that across the iterative choice trials, those who
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chose the immediate choice should have a positive selection bias score, and those who
chose the delayed choice should have a negative selection bias score.
Method
Participants
A total of 28 college age students (21 female) attending James Madison
University were recruited through the Department of Psychology’s Participant Pool and
used for the final analysis. Participants received course credit for participation upon
completion of the study. The entire session lasted approximately 15 minutes. Participants
who wore glasses were screened out through the recruitment process.
Apparatus
Tobii Pro Glasses 2 was used to video record the eye tracking information during
the decision-making tasks. These glasses used a binocular eye tracking system with
corneal reflection and dark pupil techniques. Sampling rates for the eye tracking was 50
Hz. The camera system used to capture scene used four eye-tracking sensors and
contained 1920 x 1080 video resolution with a refresh rate of 25 frames per second. The
scene camera field view captured approximately 82 degrees horizontal and 52 degrees
vertical (160 degree horizontally, 70 degrees vertically due to frame obstruction).
Task
A within–subjects experimental design was used, where all participants completed
all tasks and all conditions. The decision-making task used in the study was the same
used by Holt, Green, & Myerson (2012). The task consisted of two conditions each
consisting of a $100 and $1,000 amount across five delayed values (1 month, 6 months, 1
year, 5 years, 10 years). Each choice condition consisted of six iterative choice trials. The
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first choice presented was between a smaller reward, available immediately and a larger
reward, available at a delay. The smaller reward was half the amount of larger reward
(e.g., $500 now versus $1,000 in 1 week). In the 5 subsequent choices, the immediate
reward was adjusted based on the previous choice. If the participant chose the immediate
reward, the amount of the next immediate reward was decreased. If the participant chose
the delayed reward, the amount of the next immediate reward was increased.
The size of the adjustment itself decreased or increased by half the amount of the
difference between the immediate and delayed rewards of the previous choice. For
example, if the participant chose $500 now over $1,000 in 1 week, the next immediate
choice was between $250 now over $1,000 in 1 week. If in subsequent choice the
participant chose $1,000 in 1 week over $250 now, the next immediate choice was
between $375 now over $1,000 in 1 week. This procedure was repeated until the
participant made 6 choices for each delay and was designed to converge on the subjective
value of the delayed reward.
A potential artifact of the fixed-sequence and titration procedure is that the only
smaller, amount variable changes during each condition. Thus, control measures were
implemented throughout the study. To control for the immediate choice always being
presented on the left, the discounting application randomly assigns which choice is
presented on the left; however, this presentation is held constant throughout the task. In
the standard task 18 participants experienced the delayed choice presented on the left and
10 participants experienced the immediate choice presented on the left. Likewise, for the
random task, 18 and 10 participants experienced the delayed and immediate choices on
the right and left, respectively.

ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOR

19

To further control for any artifacts, participants completed two decision-making
tasks: standard and randomized. In the standard task, the choice trials were presented in a
linear fashion where the participant made six choices about one delay at a time, but the
order of the delays presented was randomized. For example, participants completed six
choice trials at the one-week delay and then six choice trials at the five-years delay. The
procedure for the random task was the same as that for the standard task, except that the
choices were presented in a way that the participant could not predict next choice. For
example, the participants would make a choice between $50 now and $1,000 in 1 year,
and the next choice would be between $25 now and $100 in 5 years. The two tasks were
pseudo-randomized so that the tasks were not presented in the same order for each
participant. Altogether participants completed 60 choice trials per task (120 choice trials
in total).
Procedure
Participants first consented to participating in the study. Afterwards, each
participant fit the glasses to their face using adjustable nose pieces to ensure comfort and
accurate recordings during the experiment. Then a one-dot calibration check was
implemented via the Tobii Glasses Pro 2 software. Participants completed both decisionmaking tasks while using a chin rest to stabilize their head. The screen was presented
about 12 inches away from the participant. A 5-minute break was provided in between
decision-making tasks. If the participant chose to take a break, the calibration check
procedure was repeated before the start of the next task. In the beginning of the decisionmaking task, participants read general instructions below:
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You will be asked to make a group of choices between hypothetical monetary
alternatives. These choices will be displayed on the screen. For each choice, you
will specify the option you would prefer with a mouse click. There are no correct
or incorrect choices. We are interested in the option you would prefer.
On these trials, one amount of money is to be paid right now and one amount is to
be paid after a specified delay. The screen will show you how long the delay will
be. You will complete a practice trial to become familiar with the task. If you have
any questions at this point, please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter. Please
evaluate each choice carefully before selecting the alternative you prefer.
Six practice choices were used to orient the participants to the decision-making
task at the beginning of each task. Choice responses were recorded via the discounting
application, and eye-movements were recorded during the decision-making task via Tobii
Pro Glasses 2 software.
Results
Data Preparations
A total of 40 participants were originally recruited. Twelve participants were
removed from the final analysis for the following reasons: (a) calibration issues (i.e., the
software failed to calibrate or the participant moved their head which disrupted the
calibration), (b) no fixation data via Tobii Pro Lab was obtained for a choice trial, and/or
(d) issues with fixation and fixation durations via Tobii Pro Lab (i.e., the output results
did not match the video results).
Tobii Pro lab was used to draw four areas of interests (AOI). AOIs contained
monetary values and delay amounts presented in the decision-making task but were not
visible to the participants. AOIs were mapped onto a photograph of the scene viewed by
the participants and were identical in size (830 x 310 pixel height). Tobii Pro Lab was
used to calculate AOI fixation and fixation durations. AOI Fixations were calculated by
using the velocity-threshold identification (I-VT) Attention Filter. A fixation was
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classified as any directional shift in the eye less than 100 degrees per second. A fixation
duration was classified as any fixation greater than 60 ms.
To calculate the proportion of choosing the immediate choice (PSI),
experimenters watched recordings via Tobii Pro Lab across each choice trial for all
participants for both standard and random tasks. A “1” designated that the participant
chose the immediate reward. A “2” designated that the participant chose the delayed
reward. The count of 1's and 2's were summed and divided by 6 (iterative choice trials) to
create the proportion of choosing the immediate choice or delayed choice, respectively.
Choice Behavior
Figure 1 presents the group mean subjective value plotted as a function of delay.
In order to compare the discounting of monetary amounts, subjective value was
calculated as a proportion of the actual delayed amount. The curves represent Equation 2
fit to the group average data using a nonlinear, least squares algorithm. The results for the
standard and random tasks are shown in the upper and lower graphs, respectively. The R s
2

for the standard task were 0.66 and 0.81 for the $100 and $1,000 conditions, respectively.
The R s for the random task were 0.85 and 0.95 for the $100 and $1,000 conditions
2

respectively. At the group level, the $100 was discounted more steeply than the $1,000
and was well described by Equation 2 (hyperbola). Thus, we replicated magnitude effects
from previous literature (Green & Myerson, 2013; Franco-Watkins et al., 2016). Also, the
rate of discounting between the standard and random titration procedures were
qualitatively similar. See Table 1 for a summary of discounting variables.
The fact that the rates of discounting were well described by Equation 2 does not
resolve the statistical errors that might result due to that the fact that thee k parameter is
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often highly skewed (Green, Myerson, & Warusawitharana, 2001). Therefore, AUC
values for each participant (see Table 1) were generated based on the obtained $1,000
subjective values to provide a single, approximately distributed, atheoretical measure of
the degree of discounting (Green, Myerson, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The subjective
value was expressed as a proportion of $1,000, and the delays were expressed as a
proportion of 10 years. AUC scores can range from 0, indicating the steepest rate of
discounting, to 1.0, indicating the shallowest rate of discounting.
We also replicated strong correlations between choice behavior measures of AUC
and PSI (r = -.85, p < .00 for standard $1,000 gains; r = -.81, p < .00 for random $1,000
gains). Thus, we were able to support claims by Franco-Watkins et al. (2016) that both
techniques yield similar patterns of intertemporal choices. See Table 2 for a summary of
PSI and AUC values.
Eye-Tracking Variables
To examine differential allocation of attention to different choice elements of the
two tasks we examined the mean number of fixations per AOI for each task (see Figure
2). Table 2 collapses these findings across time periods per task to simplify the
presentation of the general eye-tracking variables. A 2 (task type: standard and random) x
2 (choice: small and large) x 2 (choice elements: amount and delay) repeated measures
ANOVA was used. A main effect for task type (F (1,27) = 6.996, p = .013,  p = .206)
and choice (F (1,27) = 11.256, p = .002,  p = .294) were found, but not for the choice
elements (F (1,27) = .046, p = .832). People looked more at each AOI in the random task
and looked more at the delayed choice more than the immediate choice. Only a two-way
interaction between amount and choice elements approached significance (F (1,27) =
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4.150, p = .052,  p = .113). People looked more at the smaller amount variable and
larger delay variable (see figure 3) A three-way interaction did not emerge (F (1,27) =
.098, p = .757). 
Attention and Choice Behavior
To replicate selection bias (SB) scores based on fixations, we used Formula 6. A
SB score of +1 indicates extreme bias to the immediate choice parameter, SB score of -1
indicates extreme bias to the delayed choice parameter, and SB score of 0 indicates no
specific bias. These values were also calculated at a trial by trial level per participant.
Strong correlations were found between fixation and fixation durations (r = .76, p = .000
for standard $1,000 gains; r = .75, p = .000 for random $1,000 gains). Thus, we were able
to support that both measures of yield similar interpretations of overt attention to AOIs
for the basis of SB scores (Franco-Watkins et al., 2016). The subsequent data report
fixations as the basis for SB scores.
As in Franco-Watkins et al. (2016), we averaged SB scores across trials to make
comparisons comparable to AUC and PSI. The left panel of Figure 4 presents the scatter
plot representing the relationship between the averaged SB score per participant and PSI.
The right panel of Figure 3 presents the same relationship with AUC values. Averaged
SB scores ranged from .16 to -.34 for standard $1,000 and .29 to -.46 for random $1,000.
We ran a simple linear-regression with both averaged PSCI and AUC scores. Although
there was a positive relationship between SB and PSI in the standard titration procedure
(r = .323, p = .047), we found that SB scores were not a significant predictor of PSI for
$1,000 gains across both tasks: standard (b = .343, t(26) = 1.738, p = .094, R = .104,
2

F(1,26) = 3.019, p = .094); and random (b = -.106, t(26) = -.521, p = .607, R = .010,
2
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F(1,26) = .272, p = .607). However, we found that SB scores were a significant predictor
of AUC for the standard task (b = -.838, t(26) = -2.930, p = .007, R = .248, F(1,26) =
2

8.586, p = .007), but not the random task (b = ..035, t(26) = 136, p = .893, R = .027,
2

F(1,27) = .018, p = .893).
Figure 5 presents the average SB scores for those who chose the immediate or
delayed choice across the 6 iterative choice trials. The top panel of Figure 4 represents
the standard titration procedure, while the bottom panel represents the random titration
procedure. In the standard titration procedure, those who selected the immediate choice
tend to look at the immediate choice (at least during the last three iterative choice trials).
Across both standard and random titration procedures, those who chose the delayed
choice looked at the delay choice.
Discussion
The present study sought to replicate the findings from previous literature that
support selection bias predicts intertemporal choice behavior (Franco-Watkins et al.,
2016). Given literature to support that no systematic differences arise between a fixedsequence design and titration procedure discounting procedures (Odum & Baumann,
2010; Rodzon et al., 2011), a titration procedure was used to measure the rates of delay
discounting. The methods were also designed to control for potential artifacts in the
previous literature. Further, the study also examined selection bias scores across iterative
choice trials as participants arrived at indifference.
Overall, in terms of choice behavior, subjective value decreased as the delay to
the larger, later choice increased; indicating that, at-least at the group level, discounting
occurred. Although this was not a primary goal of the current study, participants
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displayed magnitude effects. The study also replicated similar results between other
measures of choice behavior. Strong correlations existed between PSI and AUC.
In general, we found support for that task type and amount resulted in different
allocation of attention. Participants fixated more in the random task and fixated more on
the delayed choices than the immediate choices in both tasks. In other words, when
participants could not predict the next logical choice, they searched for more information
and looked more at the delayed choice. Contrary to Franco-Watkins et al. (2016),
participants looked at both amount and delay variables equally. This could be due to the
limited distance between the variables. It should be noted that the distance had no impact
on the overall selection bias scores, because the formula collapses both
variables. Although not significant, participants looked more at the amount variables for
the immediate choice and delay variables for the immediate choice regardless of the task.
This would make sense, given that the smaller, delay (e.g., now) and larger, amount (e.g.,
$1,000) variables are held constant throughout the tasks.
When examining selection bias and choice behavior, we found partial evidence to
support claims by Franco-Watkins et al. (2016). Selection bias was a significant predictor
of AUC values only in the standard titration procedure, but selection bias was not a
significant predictor of the proportion of choosing the immediate option. In the random
titration procedure, selection bias was not a significant predictor of either choice behavior
measure. Also, when examining selection bias and choice behavior across the six iterative
choice trials, the effects hold true. In other words, when choices are presented in a logic
sequence, where the next choice is in the same delay condition, participants that chose the
immediate choice, looked at the immediate choice. However, when the choices are
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presented in a random sequence, what participants looked at did not predict what they
choose.
The current findings suggest there is a potential artifact of the fixed-sequence and
titration procedures. Firstly, Franco-Watkins et al. (2016) always presented the
immediate choice on the left. The authors also found a consistent pattern of participants
first look to the immediate option, which they concluded was consistent with reading left
to right. The current findings could also suggest similar results with more people
experiencing the delay choice of the left and a general selection bias towards the delay
choice. However, across both tasks only 18 (64%) of participants experienced the delay
choice on the left, and 10 (36%) of participants experienced the immediate choice on the
left. Of the 28 participants, 13 (46%) experienced the delayed choice on the left for both
tasks. The remaining 15 participants experienced a mix of either choice option of the left
or the immediate presented on the left across both tasks. The discounting task application
also controlled the random presentation. Although any bias that might have occurred,
could be due to the 12 participants that were excluded from the final analysis. It is
unlikely that the results are due to the discounting task.
It is also the case that any findings could be a result of group level analyses.
When selection bias scores and choice behavior measures are collapsed across delays,
significant results are found. However, at a more individual level (e.g., across choice
trials), the expected results did not hold true. In the standard titration procedure, those
who chose the immediate choice did not always look at the immediate choice. Also, in
the random procedure, even those who chose the immediate choice looked at the delayed
choice more often.

ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOR

27

There is a potential limitation with attention and choice behavior in general.
Researchers in the eye-tracking and reading field rely on cognitive interpretations of
behavior and what is known as the “eye-mind assumption” (Just & Carpenter, 1980).
This assumption states that when the eye moves to a target (e.g., $1,000), the mind begins
to process the information immediately. While this assumption is generally accepted in
the field (Orquin & Loose, 2013), this assumption does not account for covert shifts in
attention without moving one’s eye (Franco-Watkins & Johnson, 2011b). In other words,
a participant could fixate on the immediate amount but be attending to the delayed
choice. Our findings suggest that covert mechanisms might be at play in terms of
decision-making with intertemporal choices.
Two limitations in the current study exist. First, the screen was positioned about
12 inches away from the participants. Therefore, it was possible for the participants to
view both immediate and delayed choices at the same time. Our effects could be driven
by the fact that participants did not have to revisit options as often in order to make a
decision. However, this factor was held constant across both tasks and yet clear
differences emerged and this is normally case in typical discounting procedures.
Selection bias predicted choice behavior when choices were presented in a logical
sequence but did not when the choice patterns were randomized. Anecdotally, when
viewing the video recordings, it is clear that participants looked at each choice option and
variables. Second, the distance between immediate and delayed choices and the amount
and delay variables was small (about 3 inches and 1 inch, respectively). This was due to
an artifact of discounting application that was not controlled for due to resource
constraints. Yet again, the data show clear differences between the tasks.
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Future research should control for these limitations by decreasing the distance
between the monitor and the participant or by increasing the distance between each AOI
variable in order to force the participants’ eye movements to specific AOIs. Future
research should also focus on investigating other ways of studying attention and how that
impacts intertemporal choice behavior. Attention is a way that people gather information.
We then use this information to behave. Stated another way, attention is an input of data
and our behavior is the output of that data. We gather data through all of our senses.
Studying only the eye-movements is a narrow definition of attention. How might other
sensation modalities inform researchers of the processes involved in decision-making?
The current study was the first attempt to replicate and extend findings that
showed attention predicts intertemporal choice behavior. Eye-tracking is a wellestablished method for studying attentional processing and decision-making. However,
within intertemporal choice procedures results are suspect. Continued research is still
needed to better understand the processes underlying discounting.
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Table 1
Mean values when Eq. 2 was fit to the data from each participant by task type
Mean
Task
Small
Large
Standard
.66
.81
Randomized
.85
.95
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Table 2
Mean Summary of Choice Behavior Measures by Task
Standard
Randomized
Participant
PSI
AUC
PSI
AUC
P1
0.21
0.44
0.47
0.38
P2
0.34
0.26
0.53
0.18
P3
0.27
0.52
0.30
0.54
P4
0.21
0.49
0.57
0.37
P5
0.28
0.35
0.33
0.39
P6
0.07
0.82
0.40
0.31
P7
0.36
0.45
0.43
0.39
P8
0.00
0.99
0.13
0.83
P9
0.42
0.34
0.47
0.31
P10
0.32
0.37
0.43
0.31
P11
0.20
0.52
0.47
0.51
P12
0.25
0.49
0.40
0.38
P13
0.14
0.45
0.40
0.21
P14
0.56
0.10
0.77
0.05
P15
0.39
0.11
0.77
0.13
P16
0.27
0.29
0.67
0.13
P17
0.39
0.26
0.57
0.28
P18
0.31
0.48
0.63
0.07
P19
0.11
0.53
0.40
0.60
P20
0.41
0.24
0.53
0.33
P20
0.52
0.12
0.87
0.03
P21
0.17
0.42
0.23
0.52
P22
0.32
0.39
0.43
0.31
P23
0.32
0.48
0.33
0.34
P24
0.55
0.07
0.47
0.09
P25
0.20
0.79
0.23
0.88
P26
0.28
0.50
0.37
0.46
P27
0.27
0.28
0.47
0.21
P28
0.21
0.44
0.47
0.38
Note: PSI = proportion of choosing the immediate choice averaged across all delay
conditions; AUC = area under the curve
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Table 3
Summary Eye-Tracking Variables for$1,000 Amounts by Task
Standard
AOI Variable
M (SD)
Small Amount
1.88 (1.29)
Small Delay
1.53 (1.34)
Large Amount
1.91 (1.46)
Large Delay
2.00 (1.29)
Note: AOI = area of interest
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Randomized
M (SD)
1.97 (1.17)
1.96 (1.44)
2.22 (1.46)
2.78 (1.76)
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Figure 1. Mean subjective values plotted as function of delay at the group level for the
standard and randomized titration procedure. Predicted values are displayed as a solid
line.
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Figure 2. Mean number of fixations for each AOI of the standard and random titration
procedure. Error bars are represented by the standard error of the mean (SEM).
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Figure 3. Two-way interaction of choice and variables from the repeated-measures
ANOVA (p = .052).
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Figure 4. Scatter plots representing the relationship between selection bias scores and
proportion of immediate choices selected (left panel), and proportion of immediate choice
and AUC (right panel) for $1,000 gains.
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Figure 5. Mean selection bias across the iterative choice trials of the standard (top panel)
and random (bottom panel) titration procedure. Error bars represent the standard error of
the mean (SEM).

